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Practitioner communication is commonly criticized for substituting emotion 
for policy, while deliberative communication is critiqued for removing emotion from 
reason altogether. This study proposes agonism as an attempt to bridge the divide. 
Agonistic political communication strives to substantively inform and motivate 
citizens. Furthermore, it attempts to shift unavoidable political divides from the moral 
realm to the political realm. To study the effects of all three message types, sample 
messages were constructed to reflect the differing theoretical approaches. These 
messages then served as the basis of small group discussions about politics and the 
economy. A pretest/posttest design was utilized to measure how the messages 
affected levels of political knowledge, efficacy, party favorability, social trust and 
institutional trust. Qualitative analysis of short answers and video recorded discussion 
offered further understanding of effects. Statistical analysis offered little support for 
agonism, but qualitative analysis showed agonism had potential to fulfill its 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
On its most basic level, democracy is a form of government based on the 
principle of popular sovereignty. As Lincoln put it, democracy is a “government of 
the people, by the people, for the people” (Lincoln, 1863). While agreeing with 
democracy in principle, citizens, practitioners, and scholars find themselves 
disagreeing about communication’s role in achieving that goal.  
On one side of the spectrum is what I will call the practitioner approach. 
Candidates and campaign staff commonly use the practitioner approach in political 
campaigns. While the practitioner approach is not universally used, it is 
representative of a prominent portion of political campaign communication. This 
approach focuses almost solely on the short-term goals of winning elections. By 
focusing on the short-term, practitioners create a form of political communication 
concerned with motivating individuals to vote for particular candidates. Part of that 
process involves reducing complex political problems to simple slogans (Germond, 
2004). However, this approach does not encourage or focus on creating long-term 
engagement with the public sphere. While the practitioner approach may be effective 
for short-term results, it can be criticized for underestimating the average citizen, 
creating acrimonious divisions, disregarding citizens between elections, and upsetting 
the normal function of the public sphere (Hillygus & Shields, 2008; Kelley, 1960).  
On the other side of the democratic spectrum are the deliberative democratic 
theorists. Unlike practitioners, deliberative theorists focus on creating long-term 




deliberative theorists believe citizens have a responsibility to both be fully informed 
on the issues and participate in on-going democratic discussions that ideally achieve 
consensus (Dahl, 1989; McCombs & Reynolds, 1999; Habermas, 1996; Mill, 1991). 
This theoretical approach thus necessitates a form of political communication that 
removes strategic and values-based communication meant to serve short-term goals 
and replaces it with rational arguments and substantive policy information. The 
deliberative approach, however, can also be critiqued. For instance, deliberative 
theorists may demand too much of individuals, requiring too much of their time and 
demanding they objectively reason without subjective emotion.  
In an attempt to bridge the divide between these two approaches, I propose a 
third way of approaching political communication based on Chantal Mouffe’s (2005) 
conceptualization of agonistic democracy. This third way of political communication, 
termed agonism, utilizes the emotional draw of the practitioner approach while also 
incorporating the substantive policy information vital to the deliberative approach. 
Furthermore, instead of consensus as its objective, agonistic communication aims to 
achieve a partisan divide solely within the political realm that is based on both mutual 
respect and an acknowledgement that consensus is impossible. Once the agonistic 
approach has been articulated, this study examines the ways in which the three types 
of communication influence individual political knowledge, efficacy, social trust, 
institutional trust, and party favorability. Concerned with drawing a holistic picture, 
this study measured democratic outcomes that are important to both deliberative 




With these goals in mind, this study examines the influence of practitioner, 
deliberative, and agonistic political messages. My hope is to offer the theoretical 
underpinnings of agonistic political communication and test it alongside more 
established methods to highlight its potential as a third way. To this end, I begin by 
explicating the three theoretical approaches to democracy mentioned above, 
beginning with the more established practitioner and deliberative models.  Following 
this I introduce the agonistic approach, emphasizing how it borrows from the other 
two models, yet represents a truly new approach to political communication. After the 
theoretical section, I offer the methods and results of the study. In the end, results 
demonstrate that the practitioner message type imparts little substantive political 
knowledge, while simultaneously creating acrimonious political divisions. 
Additionally, the deliberative approach, while imparting knowledge, does little to 
contextualize that information and motivate citizens. Last, the agonistic style offers 
an approach that can both motivate and inform citizens, while avoiding antagonistic 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
The Practitioner Approach to Political Communication 
As noted in the beginning, practitioners focus primarily on the voting aspect 
of democratic citizenship. However, it would be incorrect to simply say that 
practitioners want citizens to vote. More specifically, practitioner communication is 
concerned with winning votes for a particular party/candidate. While practitioners’ 
overall goals are simple in their focus (getting their candidate elected), the strategies 
practitioners employ are not. Practitioners have learned, in fact, that getting their 
candidates elected requires several complex strategies.  
Before one can analyze strategies, however, one must first examine the 
theories that inform how practitioners conceptualize and understand their audience--
the average American voter. For practitioners, individuals are not seen as having 
solidified opinions. Instead, they argue individuals construct “opinion statements on 
the fly as they confront each new issue” (Zaller, 1992, p. 1). Individuals construct 
these opinion statements partially because they possess a limited cognitive ability to 
process information (Haider-Markel & Joslyn, 2001; Lang, 2000; Popkin, 1992). Due 
to their limited ability, Samuel Popkin (1992) argues moreover that citizens utilize 
what he terms “low-information rationality.” Popkin explains: 
This reasoning draws on various information shortcuts and rules of thumb that 
voters use to obtain and evaluate information and to simplify the process of 
choosing between candidates. People use shortcuts which incorporate much 




conversations with people they trust and according to the opinions of national 
figures whose judgments and positions they have come to know. With these 
shortcuts, they learn to “read” politicians and their positions. (p. 7) 
By viewing the voter as a low-rationality, shortcut-seeking actor, practitioners 
significantly devalue the importance of substantive policy information and debate. 
Instead, the goal becomes identifying and tapping into voters’ shortcuts.  
Currently, the predominant shortcut is the voters’ gut emotions. The belief is 
that emotional connections are more important than rationality in the average voter’s 
decision-making process. As cognitive psychologist Drew Westen (2007) argues, 
“successful campaigns compete in the marketplace of emotions and not primarily in 
the marketplace of ideas” (p. 305). From this perspective, voters are more concerned 
about how the politician makes them feel than they are with the issues the politician 
supports. Westen describes part of this emotional-based process in his description of 
candidate “curb appeal,” which “is the feeling voters get when they ‘drive by’ a 
candidate a few times on television and form an emotional impression” (p. 294). This 
low-rationality, gut-based understanding of the voter serves as the guiding principle 
of the practitioners’ political messages.  
With an understanding of how practitioners understand the voter, one must 
next examine the goals of practitioner communication. Practitioners know elections 
are won by dividing segments of the population. This is the point Bruce Ackerman 
and James Fishkin (2004) make when they suggest, “As strategic competitions for 




identity in a way that divides segments of the population against one another” (p. 2). 
The key here is not simply that practitioners divide the electorate; the important point 
is how they divide it. Practitioners produce division by creating a we/they distinction 
between their candidate’s supporters and their competitor’s most often through moral, 
rather than merely political, terms. This morality-based division is termed 
antagonism. Drew Westen (2007) provides a good example of the antagonistic 
approach when he explains that it is not enough to say one’s opponent is lying. 
Instead, one must show that he is a liar, that lying is in his moral character (p. 338). 
This antagonistic separation is usually achieved through a values-focused approach to 
campaign communication.  
From a broad perspective, the use of value reliant communication is clearly 
detailed in Thomas Frank’s (2005) book, What’s the Matter with Kansas, in which 
Frank details the Republican Party’s re-branding of its values to better appeal to 
lower-class voters. More specifically, George W. Bush might be the most notable 
modern candidate to employ such divisive moral rhetoric. David Foster (2006), 
through analyzing President Bush’s 2004 campaign rhetoric, demonstrated how Bush 
and his campaign team used the rhetorical strategy of polarization to tap into and 
exacerbate the value divisions in what is known as America’s culture war. 
Furthermore, Stanley Greenberg (2005) has noted in his discussion of Bush’s tight 
2004 election victory that, “while many factors explain so close a result, Bush won by 
waging an all-out culture war that deepened and generalized the current cultural 




illustrated how Bush’s value framing of the War in Iraq led to a moral ultimatum, 
highlighted by the statement, “either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists” 
(Bush, 2001). 
It is important to note that the Democratic Party uses this strategy as well. In 
1964, President Johnson ran advertisements against Senator Goldwater that used 
imagery and language that could easily divide the electorate along moral lines 
(http://www.livingroomcandidate.org, 2008). Most notably, President Johnson 
repeatedly associated Senator Goldwater with the Ku Klux Klan. More recently, 
Moveon.org published an article entitled “10 things to know about McCain” that 
described “the real McCain” (10 things to know about McCain, 2008). While not 
utilizing explicit moral language, the list relied on implicit moral condemnation when 
describing McCain’s stances on child health care, war, and civil rights. For instance, 
Moveon.org states, “John McCain voted against establishing a national holiday in 
honor of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Now he says his position has ‘evolved,’ yet he's 
continued to oppose key civil rights laws” (10 things to know about McCain, 2008). 
While not as explicit as others, this statement levies a strong implicit moral charge. 
These examples begin to illustrate the use of antagonistic division in practitioner 
communication.  
In order to create division, practitioners develop their messages around three 
related concepts: condensational symbols, political mythologies, and framing. While 
differing in the specific approach, all three are based on resonance, which “takes 




viewer” (Schwartz, 1972 as quoted in Johnston-Cartee & Copeland, 1997). In other 
words, resonance strategy highlights some preexisting idea or value already within 
the individual instead of giving them new information. Resonance does not so much 
cause logical thinking as it does tap into stored emotional conflicts. As Schwartz 
noted, “We are not focused on getting things across to people as much as out of 
people” (as quoted in Johnston-Cartee & Copeland, 1997).  
Condensational symbols represent the first element of a practitioner’s 
resonance message. Johnston-Cartee and Copeland (1997) define condensational 
symbols as, “a highly condensed form of substitutive behavior for direct expression, 
allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form” 
(p. 64). The importance of these symbols is that they “have more connotative 
meaning than denotative meaning. In other words, the significance of condensational 
symbols rests with the meanings that reside within the individuals that are evoked 
when the words or phrases are used” (Mead, 1934 as cited in Johnston-Cartee & 
Copeland, 1997, p. 64). Thus, employing condensational symbols allows practitioners 
to say very little, yet evoke a great deal of emotion. For example, a candidate may run 
on a platform of “family values” or “country first.” These terms, while seemingly 
very basic, communicate and activate extensive emotional meaning within the 
listener. For instance, conservative Republican candidates use “family values” to 
condense several attitudes about gay marriage, abortion, and stem cell research.  
In addition to using condensational symbols, effective practitioner political 




defined as “an unquestioned belief held in common by a large group of people that 
gives events and actions a particular meaning” (Edelman, 1971, as cited in Johnson-
Cartee & Copeland, 1997). Political myths function to construct a story for the voter 
that explains their world in an understandable way. It does this primarily through the 
use and invocation of emotion. Sykes (1970) explains, “myth is often more concerned 
with communicating an emotional response to a perception than it is with 
communicating the perception itself” (p. 20). Therefore, by creating a political myth 
that draws on condensational symbols, the practitioner both evokes emotion and 
places that emotion within a political narrative that frames the context and future 
action for the listener.  
Last, practitioners employ framing to create persuasive political messages. 
Robert Entman (1993) defines framing as the process of selecting “aspects of a 
perceived reality and (making) them more salient in communicating a text, in such a 
way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation” (p. 52).  In other words, “framing 
structures the reasoning process by activating certain constructs that are used to make 
judgments or form opinions” (Lee, McLeod & Shah, 2008, p. 698). In particular, 
practitioners utilize issue and value frames. Issue frames “focus on qualitatively 
different yet potentially relevant considerations” (Druckman, 2004, p. 672). Value 
frames, on the other hand, are concerned with linking particular values to issues in an 
attempt to “provide a comprehensible and compelling interpretive framework in 




701). Such value frames, moreover, “typically depict policy debates as clashes of 
moral principles or basic values, with parties to the conflict countering each other on 
the basis of a particular set of values” (p. 701). For example, social programs such as 
welfare are usually debated around the values of individual self-reliance and 
assistance to the disadvantaged. When conservatives discuss welfare policy, they will 
usually argue for the need to promote a culture of self-reliance. By discussing welfare 
in terms of self-reliance, a politician is able to tap into the conservative social value of 
individualism. To the listener, this value frame functions to frame welfare as a 
program that might hinder self-reliance. Thus, the program violates a conservative 
social value, which could serve to decrease its support among conservative voters.  
 Finally, the effect of this communication on voters represents the most 
important part of the process. In the broadest sense, political campaign 
communication serves a multidimensional function. First, campaigns communicate 
pertinent information and raise the public’s consciousness concerning political affairs 
(Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Denton & Woodward, 1998; Johnston-Cartee & 
Copeland, 1997; Holbrook, 1996). However, it is important to note that in political 
advertising specifically, this issue information is usually no more than vague issue 
positions (Joslyn, 1980; Kern, 1989). For example, a candidate will be “against 
crime” or for “better education.” Second, beyond simple information transmission, 
campaigns “prime us to become concerned about some issues and not others, thereby 
affecting our position-taking” (Hart, 2000, p. 76). Third, campaign communication 




1976). Fourth, they serve to reconnect voters with their elected officials and aid in the 
stimulation of the people’s voice (Hart, 2000). Examining the negative effects, 
scholars have found that negative campaign communication in particular can increase 
political cynicism while decreasing political efficacy, intention to vote, and trust in 
government (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Brader & Corrigan, 2006; Brians & 
Wattenberg, 1996; Brooks & Geer, 2007). This is important because “between 30% 
and 50% of political advertising produced can be described as negative” (Johnston-
Cartee & Copeland, 1991, p. 3). Furthermore, scholars have shown that the emotional 
aspects of the practitioner approach as well as the citizen’s emotional response to 
them can alter how citizens process new information, form political attitudes and 
make political choices (Brader, 2006).   
While the content of political communication has been shown to cause an 
array of effects, so too has the use of particular frames. Scholars have illustrated that 
different frames encourage the “activation and the use of frame-consistent thoughts 
and ideas in the process of issue interpretation…” (Lee, McLeod & Shah, 2008, p. 
701). For example, scholars (Brewer, 2002; Rhee, 1997; Shah et al., 1996) have 
found that strategic frames encourage viewers to strategically interpret political 
candidates and issues, and value frames induce viewers to interpret events in terms of 
morals or ethics. If these findings translate to this study, the outcomes and quality of 
the discussions may vary drastically depending on which “framed” message serves as 




The Deliberative Approach to Political Communication 
 As mentioned earlier, deliberative theorists view democracy as “a process 
where citizens voluntarily and freely participate in discussions on public issues. It is a 
discursive system where citizens share information about public affairs, talk politics, 
form opinions, and participate in political processes” (Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1999, p. 
361). Many scholars have reinforced the importance of deliberation in democracy 
(Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Barber, 1984; Bryce, 1888/1973; Carey, 1995; Cohen & 
Arato, 1992; Dewey, 1954; Habermas, 1984, 1996; Lasker, 1949; Oakeshott, 1991; 
Tarde, 1899/1989). By redefining democracy as a deliberative process, democratic 
citizenship becomes a year-round participatory role. Beyond voting, citizens are 
expected to stay fully informed on the issues and then use that knowledge to actively 
discuss politics in the public sphere. The discussion, ideally aimed at achieving 
consensus, should be rational and policy-based. In order to achieve this form of 
citizenship, the individual citizen must be reconceptualized.   
 This reconceptualization casts the individual as a rational and moral actor. As 
Shawn Rosenberg (2007) has argued, “In their rationality, individuals are assumed to 
be able to consider and order their specific preferences and values relative to their 
overall life plan and their sense of higher-order good” (p. 6).  This understanding is 
very much in line with rational choice theory that claims individuals will rationally 
choose options that benefit them the most (Downs, 1957). Beyond rationality, 
deliberative theorists believe that individuals can also act morally. However, the key 




argued, “The desired critical self-reflection and fair orientation to the other can only 
be realized in an actual encounter with the beliefs, values and arguments of other 
citizens” (p. 7). From this perspective, citizens are viewed as rational individual 
actors who become moral actors when confronted with differing opinions during 
discussion.   
By viewing discussion as the key to unlocking an individual’s rational and 
moral potential, it makes sense that deliberative theorists’ goal is to create political 
communication that informs an ongoing citizen discussion based on inclusiveness, 
rationality, and equality (Barber, 1984; Dewey, 1954; Gundersen, 2000; Habermas, 
1984). As Habermas (1984) explained, the intended goal of this conversation is the 
creation of consensus/mutual understanding. Deliberative theorists are, therefore, as 
concerned with the means of communication as they are with its results. In other 
words, deliberation as a process yields important benefits including: providing greater 
legitimacy to the governmental process, validating political decisions, and increasing 
a sense of shared interests, social connectedness, and political efficacy (Gastil & 
Levine, 2005; Gundersen, 2000).  
Out of these goals and a rational conception of the voter grow deliberative 
theory as a practice. The work of deliberative pollsters might be the most visible 
application of deliberative theory. Deliberation-based polling was created in response 
to typical public opinion polling, which relies on gathering the public’s current 
opinion through surveys. However, as both deliberative theorists and practitioners 




to determine and report what the public’s opinion would be if they were given the 
time and information necessary to think about and deliberate over the pertinent 
information. Essential to the distinction between the practitioner approach and the 
deliberative approach is the input individuals receive. As discussed earlier, 
practitioners produce messages constructed around condensational symbols, myths 
and framing. In turn, these messages have high emotional value, but lack any serious 
substantive information. On the other side of the spectrum, deliberative studies 
provide participants with their ideal democratic situation: “Instead of getting their 
information from sound bites, they read briefing materials, listen to policy experts and 
political leaders, and in many cases are inspired to seek additional information on 
their own” (McCombs & Reynolds, 1999, p. 4).  
So what happens when citizens are given substantive information and time to 
deliberate? On the highest level, public deliberation allows for the cultivation of 
“enlarged” or “representative minds” (Arendt, 1958). Thinking with a representative 
mind means that one is able to set aside personal interests and instead judge from a 
universal perspective that is concerned with what everyone has in common. This in 
turn can lead to impartial reciprocity, or acting without regard to one’s potential loss 
or benefit (Chambers, 1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996; Kim, 
Wyatt, & Katz, 1991).  On the micro level, public deliberation serves as an opinion 
testing ground.  Popkin (1991) found, for instance, that conversation serves a two-
fold purpose. First, conversation can serve as the source of political information. 




person” for information. Second, conversations serve to give meaning to information 
acquired elsewhere.  “The campaign and the media only send the initial messages; 
until these messages have been checked with others and validated, their full effects 
are not felt” (Popkin, 1991, p. 46). Focusing specifically on opinion formation, Zaller 
(1992) and Zaller and Feldman (1992) explain that through conversation individuals 
are able to test their “idea elements,” which allows them to reduce cognitive 
inconsistencies. The end result of this testing is that individuals enhance their 
opinions and arguments (Billing, 1996; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1991; Kuhn, 1991, 
Lasker, 1949).  
 The influence of deliberation extends beyond opinion formation. Deliberation 
has also been found to increase issue knowledge, political efficacy, political interest, 
and opinion formation (Gabor, 2007; Min, 2007). Moreover, deliberation has been 
shown to partially debunk a longstanding criticism of large-scale democracy: the 
citizen’s inability to comprehend and function in the political sphere. Using the 
deliberative polling design, scholars have been able to conclude that citizens do 
indeed possess the ability to rationally handle political matters. They have found that 
this ideal form of political deliberation leads to substantial knowledge gain and often 
produces significant opinion change (Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; Iyengar, Fishkin, & 
Luskin, 2005; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002), as well as limiting or eliminating 




The Need for a New Approach  
Shifting slightly from the format followed in the previous two sections, I 
begin this section by explaining how the conflicted findings and theoretical 
shortcomings of the other two approaches create a need for a new form of political 
communication. From that point, I will introduce agonism as a form of political 
communication that utilizes the strengths of the previous approaches while also 
directly addressing their limitations.  
By comparing the practitioner and deliberative approaches, one can assess the 
advantages and disadvantages of each. Beginning with the practitioner approach, it is 
obviously correct in its conception of the individual as an emotional being. As the 
political cognitive psychology literature has clearly illustrated, emotions make up a 
large portion of the political arena. Practitioners and psychologists alike have found 
that citizens, even after reviewing policy information, will choose to vote for the 
candidate opposite their policy stances if they connect with that candidate on a gut-
emotional level (Sosnik et. al., 2007; Lakoff, 2004; Westen, 2007). This sort of 
values-first approach directly contrasts with the established idea that voters begin the 
candidate evaluation process on the policy level and use that to inform their value 
judgments.  
 However, the fact that voters may start by evaluating values does not imply 
that the process always results in the ideal decision. The ideal decision in this context 
refers to the conclusion (or candidate) the voter would choose if given all the 




that informs or relates to the decision at hand. Instead, gut-level impressions serve the 
same function as the short cuts, or heuristic cues, described by Popkin (1992). While 
effective, these shortcuts do not always lead to the ideal decision. The levels of 
opinion change after informed deliberative discussion strongly illustrate the potential 
failure of these shortcuts.  During the 1996 National Issues Convention, a four-day in-
person deliberation-based poll that used a national random sample of 450 individuals, 
James Fishkin and Robert Luskin found that participants experienced significant net 
policy attitude change on topics such as welfare, foreign policy, the economy and 
whatever issue they considered to be the biggest problem facing America (McCombs 
& Reynolds, 1999). Fishkin and Luskin summarize that “participants changed 
positions significantly on 25 of 49 policy issues and on 5 of 10 empirical premises” 
(McCombs & Reynolds, 1999, p. 25). So it becomes clear that emotion alone does not 
always lead to the ideal decision. It is also important to note that academics are not 
the only ones asking for more substantive political communication. Lipsitz, Trost, 
Grossmann and Sides (2005) found that politically involved citizens actually desire 
more substantive campaign communication as well. While politically involved 
citizens desire increased substance and while it has been shown to create more ideal 
decisions among voters, one must ask: does substantive policy information engage 
and motivate the voter enough to actually enter the political arena in a natural, 
everyday setting?  
American politics is complex and difficult to understand even for the most 




Citizens and political theorists have long discussed the difficulty of citizenship in 
large-scale democracies. As Lippmann (1922) noted, American democracy had 
become so complex that most citizens feel like deaf spectators sitting in the back row. 
Since Lippmann’s time, American democracy has only grown larger and more 
complex. The increasing size of the democratic state puts the individual citizen 
“under a strange form of psychological pressure” (Allen, 2004). While building up 
individuals as sovereigns, the sheer size of the state simultaneously undercuts the 
individual’s sovereignty (Allen, 2004). So what would motivate normal citizens, 
concerned with the daily grind of ensuring their own economic stability and trying to 
develop an enriching emotional life, to jump into politics? The deliberative theorists 
do not offer much on these grounds. While it may be rational for citizens to involve 
themselves in the ongoing construction of the laws that regulate their lives, the payoff 
is usually too evasive or delayed to serve as a strong motivator. Therefore, from the 
rational actor perspective, citizens would be better off pursuing personal wealth and 
goals outside of politics. Moreover, Danielle Allen (2004) explains, “Habermas’s 
theory of discursive practice cannot explain how reason, stripped of all affect, can 
motivate people to action or secure social integration” (p. 56). So the question arises 
again, what would motivate citizens to involve themselves in politics? The answer to 
this question comes from the practitioner perspective. In order for citizens to see 
value in the difficulty of politics, they must first have an emotional stake in the issue. 
For instance, knowing the nuanced policy issues concerning the economic recession 




make an emotional connection with the issue. They must know how it affects them 
and those they care about. Additionally, a politician is more than a set of policy 
stances. He or she is also a representative leader. Therefore, politicians must do more 
than spout policy positions; they must inspire in the electorate a sense of trust and 
belief in the possibility of democracy. Given those complications, it becomes clear 
that while the use of rationality and substantive policy information may answer one 
question, it leaves others unanswered. What is needed, then, is a middle way between 
the practitioner and deliberative approaches.  
Before introducing agonism as a new form of political communication, it 
might be helpful to summarize the argument that has been developed up to this point. 
First, practitioners view voters as predominately emotional thinkers. Thus, they 
produce content intended to create high levels of emotional resonance. In turn, this 
communication is light on policy information as it only stakes out vague policy 
positions. Furthermore, this communication seeks to create antagonistic divisions 
within the electorate along a moral (right/wrong) distinction. As for the deliberative 
approach, deliberative democrats seek to create consensus through rational 
discussion. Underlying this approach is a belief that citizens possess the ability to be 
rational actors and the belief that consensus is possible. However, as the review of the 
different approaches illustrated, voters are both rational and emotional actors. While 
they need emotional cues to become engaged, they also desire increased substance in 




The Theoretical Foundation of Agonism 
Agonism, as proposed by Chantal Mouffe (2005), represents a new organizing 
principle for democracy.  However, before one can truly understand agonism, it is 
necessary to briefly explain the current state of theory underlying our conception of 
politics and Mouffe’s critique of it. Mouffe explains: 
Sociologists claim that we have entered a ‘second modernity’ in which 
individuals liberated from collective ties can now dedicate themselves to 
cultivating a diversity of lifestyles, unhindered by antiquated attachments. The 
‘free world’ has triumphed over communism and, with the weakening of 
collective identities, a world “without enemies’ is now possible. Partisan 
conflicts are a thing of the past and consensus can now be a obtained through 
dialogue. Thanks to globalization and the universalization of liberal 
democracy, we can now expect a cosmopolitan future bringing peace, 
prosperity and the implementation of human rights worldwide. (p. 1)   
As touched on above, liberal/deliberative theorists conceptualize ‘the political’ “as a 
space of freedom and deliberation” and its goal of reaching consensus through 
rational discussion (p. 9). In this context, ‘the political’ is the theoretical space where 
individuals interact to discuss and solve problems. This is similar to Habermas’ 
theory of the public sphere. On the other hand, politics “is the set of practices and 
institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the 
context of conflictuality provided by the political” (p. 9). It is Mouffe’s argument that 




transcends division, partisanship and conflict, simply end up denying the combative 
nature of ‘the political.’ This denial causes the natural combative nature of human 
interaction (i.e., the political) to shift from the realm of the political to the “moral 
register.” By shifting to the moral realm, the we/they distinction becomes a 
distinction of right/wrong and not right/left. Once here, the danger is that the majority 
can exclude the minority from politics and justify any action against them on moral 
terms. 
To correct this issue, Mouffe argues that the political needs to be reorganized 
around the idea of agonism. Agonism proposes that we accept that a rational 
consensus among all parties is not possible. This in turn necessitates a 
reconceptualization of the political. In agonism, the political ceases being a place of 
“freedom and deliberation” and instead becomes “a space of power, conflict and 
antagonism” (p. 9). Allen (2004), while not using the same terminology, also 
addresses the conflictual nature of democracy. Allen explains that the democratic 
ideal of consensus is never fully achieved because every decision requires one party 
to sacrifice so that others may benefit. In reality then, democracy is built on the 
principle of sacrifice, and the necessity of sacrifice in a system promising freedom 
naturally brings rise to conflict.  By accepting the combative nature of the political, 
agonism allows for its expression in the political realm. By allowing the expression of 
conflict in both the political and in politics, an agonistic political distinction develops 





 As well as proposing the political as a permanently combative environment 
incapable of producing consensus, Mouffe challenges the idea that passion and 
collective identity are no longer important: 
Mobilization requires politicization, but politicization cannot exist without the 
production of a conflictual representation of the world, with opposed camps 
with which people can identify, thereby allowing for passions to be mobilized 
politically within the spectrum of the democratic process. (p. 25) 
Here, Mouffe asserts that in order for individuals to engage politics, politics must first 
be politicized. This means that clear distinctions must be drawn between the 
conflicting political parties. Only then can individuals develop the political 
identification and emotional attachment necessary for political mobilization.  
In summary, agonism argues that rational consensus is neither possible nor 
desirable. In its place, clear divisions based on political differences and not moral 
condemnation, should serve as the foundation to democracy. These divisions would 
in turn help mobilize citizens.  
The Agonistic Approach to Political Communication 
With the theoretical grounding for agonism developed, we can finally 
establish agonism as a form of political communication. To begin, the goals of 
agonistic political communication are multiple. First, agonistic political 
communication aims to create clear distinctions between parties. These distinctions 
serve both to clearly represent the conflictual nature of the political realm and also to 




distinctions should be based on agonistic and not antagonistic divisions. Second, 
agonistic political communication aims to develop collective identities within the 
electorate. By rhetorically constituting the people, political communication can help 
develop the collective associations important to democracy (Charland, 1987; McGee, 
1975). Democracy, after all, must be learned. As Charles Taylor (2007) explains, 
“Democracy always is, and must be, imagined in one historically specific way or 
another” (p. 125). In other words, before a people can fully form a democratic nation, 
they must first be able to form a common understanding of their surroundings and a 
shared sense of legitimacy, which makes common action possible. While collective 
understandings of democracy are important, they must be balanced by the 
development of social and institutional trust (Allen, 2004; Taylor, 2007). Therefore, 
the agonistic approach also aims to create citizen identification with the free 
institutions of a given society. Finally, the agonistic approach aims to engage 
emotions with the intention of motivation and inspiration, and engage the mind with 
substantive policy information with the intention of promoting critical thinking. The 
policy information functions to both ground emotions and encourage critical thinking 
because as John Zaller (1992) noted, “People are able to react critically to the 
arguments they encounter only to the extent that they are knowledgeable about 
political affairs” (p. 1). The above goals necessitate that agonistic communication 
reconceptualizes the voter. In this approach, the voter is both rational and emotional.  
Similar to the conceptualization of the voter, the content of agonistic political 




agonistic communication employs maxims, political myth and framing. These tools 
allow a politician to engage a voters’ emotion to the extent necessary to inspire 
political action. Specifically, the use of maxims allows a politician to construct the 
logical part of his or her argument around general principles (Allen, 2004, p. 146). 
This serves to both simplify the politician’s logical (i.e., policy) argument and to 
convey his or her character. Allen (2004), while explaining Aristotle’s approach to 
rhetoric, states, “Demonstrative argument about general principles brings to the fore a 
speaker’s ethical commitments concerning the treatment of others, allowing an 
audience to assess these principles easily and to decide whether they render a speaker 
reliable” (p. 146).  This is directly in line with the practitioner’s goals discussed 
earlier.  
Furthermore, political myth aids in the construction of agonistic distinctions. 
Political myths help form the substantive policy information into comprehensible, 
passionate and persuasive narratives. To accomplish this, the myths construct a 
collective identity for voters. Mouffe (2005) notes, “political discourse has to offer 
not only policies but also identities which can help people make sense of what they 
are experiencing as well as giving them hope for the future” (p. 25). As well as 
constituting a collective identity, the myths also function to reinforce the values of a 
given society’s free institutions.  
While it is important to note what is in agonistic communication, it is also 
important to note what is not in it. Agonistic political communication avoids value 




does not eliminate divisive rhetoric all together. Instead, these divisions are shifted 
out of the moral realm and into to the political realm. This shift is vital because it still 
allows for the practitioners’ goal of dividing the electorate to enhance the ease of 
electoral choice. However, by creating the division in the political realm, agonism 





Chapter 3: Hypotheses and Methods 
Hypotheses  
Building on these theoretical arguments, the researcher proposes six 
hypotheses regarding the influence of practitioner, deliberative, and agonistic 
messages on measures of political knowledge, efficacy, social trust, institutional trust, 
and party favorability. Regarding the practitioner style, researchers have discovered 
that it can communicate political knowledge (Brians & Wattenberg, 1996; Denton & 
Woodward, 1998; Johnston-Cartee & Copeland, 1997; Holbrook, 1996), but this 
knowledge is usually vague issue positions (Joslyn, 1980; Kern, 1989). Furthermore, 
the practitioner style utilizes strong emotional language to advance one party and 
condemn the other. This usually results in a division within the moral arena. Based on 
these findings, the researcher advances the following hypotheses for the practitioner 
message:  
H1: Discussion of the “practitioner” message will increase party favorability, and 
political knowledge across Patterson and McClure’s Issue Awareness scale 
and Iyengar, Fishkin and Luskin’s political party ideology placement scale.  
H2: Discussion of the “practitioner” message will not increase political knowledge 
on the Political Information Scale, political efficacy, social trust, or 
institutional trust.  
Concerning the deliberative message, researchers have found that the deliberative 
message style can lead to increased levels of political knowledge (Fishkin & Luskin, 




Furthermore, this approach can lead to impartial reciprocity, or acting without regard 
to one’s potential loss or benefit, which is a key component to social trust (Chambers, 
1996; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996; Habermas, 1996; Kim, Wyatt, & Katz, 1991). 
These results suggest the plausibility of the next two hypotheses.  
H3: Discussion of the “deliberative” message will increase political knowledge 
across all three measures, and increase social trust and institutional trust.   
H4: Discussion of the “deliberative” message will not increase political efficacy, or 
party favorability.  
Finally, the theoretical approach to agonism attempts to combine key elements of 
both the practitioner and deliberative messages. First, agonism utilizes the emotional 
language and myth found in the practitioner messages to engage and motivate 
citizens. Second, agonism relies on factual information and reasoned argument to 
persuade listeners. Drawing on this theoretical approach, the researcher proposes the 
last two hypotheses.   
H5: Discussion of the “agonistic” message will increase party favorability.  
H6: Discussion of the “agonistic” message will increase political knowledge across 
all three scales, political efficacy, social trust and institutional trust.  
 
Methods 
The Participant Sample 
A total of 126 undergraduates, 92 female and 34 male, from a large state 




from the following ethnic categories: Non-Hispanic (Caucasian) 86.5%, Multi-racial 
or mixed race 4.8%, African American 3.2%, Spanish or Hispanic origin 3.2%, and 
Asia or Pacific Islander 2.4%. The mean age for participants was 20, with a 
maximum of 52 and a minimum of 18. The age range was 34, with only six 
participants over the age of 22, and one participant not reporting. Participant pretest 
party identification was balanced with 42.9% identifying as Democrats, 34.9% 
Republican, 15.9% Independent, and 6.3% identifying as other. A total of 12 
discussion groups were conducted, four for each message type, with each discussion 
group having between 7-13 participants. Participants were randomly assigned to each 
discussion group.   
All participants received research credit for taking part in the study. Before 
participating, students had to provide their name and the name of their COMS 130 
instructor. This information was used only to inform the instructors of their student’s 
participation. After notifying the instructors, this information was dropped from the 
data. It is important to note that participants were enrolled in COMS 130, a public 
speech class, at the time of the study. The course’s focus on public speech and critical 
listening may have primed the participants to be more critical than normal when 
presented with a message.  
Experimental Design 
The researcher constructed three political campaign messages using the three 
approaches outlined thus far (see Appendix). Each message was constructed in such a 




throughout the paper. Furthermore, the researcher consulted the communication of 
actual political organizations in order to ensure the accuracy of the language in the 
deliberative and practitioner messages.  
Upon arriving for the study, participants were randomly seated around the 
discussion table five minutes before the start of the study. At the start of the study, 
participants were asked to fill out a written consent form and sign an attendance 
sheet. Once participants gave their consent to participate in the study, they were given 
a brief introduction to the study and an explanation of what they would be doing 
during the hour and a half meeting time. After the introduction, the researcher 
distributed the pretest survey and gave oral instructions. Participants then had roughly 
twenty minutes to complete the survey. Once all participants completed the survey, 
they received one of the constructed political messages along with the short-answer 
questions and a half sheet of paper for note taking throughout discussion. The 
participants were given roughly 15 minutes to read the message and answer the short-
answer questions. When all of the participants completed the short answer questions, 
the researcher collected the short-answer sheet and allowed the participants to keep 
the political messages.   
After completing the pretest and short-answer questions, participants engaged 
in a 45-minute, videotaped discussion led by a facilitator. The facilitator started the 
discussion by having everyone briefly introduce him or herself by first name only and 
state the job they hoped to have upon graduation. In order to ensure discussion, the 




all of the groups. After the discussion group finished, participants completed a 
posttest containing the same questions as the pretest.   
Measurements 
This study relied on a standard pretest-posttest design to gauge the influence 
of the message and discussion. Prior to beginning the discussion session, participants 
completed a 36-question pretest survey covering a wide range of measurements 
including political knowledge, efficacy, party identification, party favorability, social 
trust, and institutional trust.1 Upon completion of the survey, participants received the 
political message and three short answer questions meant to probe their feelings 
towards the message and prime discussion. Immediately after discussion concluded, 
participants completed a posttest consisting of the same 36 questions used in the 
pretest.  
Political Knowledge  
This study utilized a multi-dimensional conception of political knowledge. In 
order to assess general issue and party position knowledge, this study used parts of 
Patterson and McClure’s Issue Awareness scale (henceforth called Issue Awareness 
Scale). For this study, the Issue Awareness Scale reported an  = .37. This scale is 
based on knowledge of political parties’ stands on a series of campaign issues 
(Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 1999, p. 632). Furthermore, this study used a 
political party ideology placement scale developed by Iyengar, Fishkin and Luskin 
(2005). This scale measured an individual’s ability to correctly place the Republican 
                                                 




and Democratic parties on four issue scales concerning trade, military, and social 
policy (original  = .91, this study  = .60). Henceforth, this scale will be referred to 
as the Ideology Placement Scale. Using the Political Information Scale (Iyengar,1986; 
Zaller,1986), this study also tested for factual issue knowledge. The three-item 
economic information scale was designed to “test current public affairs knowledge 
instead of ‘textbook’ knowledge” (original  = .59, this study  = .66) (Robinson, 
Shaver & Wrightsman, 1999, p. 622).    
Efficacy 
This study understands political efficacy to be made up of both internal and 
external forms of efficacy.  The first measures the belief that an individual can 
influence the political sphere; the latter measures whether or not the individual 
believes the political sphere is open to their influence.  In order to measure both 
internal and external political efficacy, this study employed a seven-question 
measurement outlined by Niemi, Craig, and Mattei (1991) (original  = .80, this 
study  = .83).  
Party Favorability 
Similar to party identification, practitioners put a great deal of importance on 
managing an individual’s feelings towards a given party. Therefore, this study 
measured party favorability using the feeling thermometer scale employed by 
Iyengar, Fishkin and Luskin (2005). Originally used in the ANES surveys in 1964, 




Party Identification scale ranged from .55 to .76 (Robinson, Shaver & Wrightsman, 
1999, p. 702). 
Social Trust and Institutional Trust  
 Social and Institutional trust are central to the success of a democracy. In 
order for a government of the people to succeed, individuals must believe that their 
fellow citizens are trustworthy. Furthermore, as discussed earlier, democracy is based 
on sacrifice. With every decision, one group inherently sacrifices for others. In light 
of this, it becomes important that individuals maintain a healthy belief in democratic 
government. To test social trust, this study used a three-part questionnaire utilized by 
Zmerli and Newton (2008) that combines the original trust question created by 
Noelle-Neumann and an additional two by Rosenberg (1956, 1957) (original  = .71, 
this study  = .89). Craig, Niemi, and Silver’s (1990) regime-based trust scale was 
employed to test institutional trust (original  = .47, this study  = .66). The content 
of this four-item scale “refers to evaluations of and willingness to change the form of 




Chapter 4: Results 
To test the study’s hypotheses, paired-samples t tests were conducted on 
participants’ pre-and post-test scores from measures of political knowledge, efficacy, 
social trust, institutional trust and party preference to evaluate whether there were 
significant changes in the means after exposure to and discussion of the three political 
messages (practitioner, deliberative, agonistic).  
The first pair of hypotheses concerned the effects of the practitioner message. 
Hypothesis one predicted that party favorability and political knowledge of issues and 
party ideology would increase after exposure to and discussion of the practitioner 
message. As Table 1 reports, results from the paired samples t test partially support 
the political knowledge section of hypothesis one. Analysis of the results indicates 
that participants’ level of political knowledge, as measured by the Issue Awareness 
Scale, increased significantly, t(43) = 2.11, p = .04. The effect size g of 1.57 indicates 
a large effect, and the 95% confidence interval for the mean difference between the 
pre and posttest was 1.18 to 12.82. Results for the practitioner message groups 
indicate that there were no significant changes between participants’ pre-and post-test 
scores for measures of the political knowledge party ideology. The party favorability 
section of hypothesis one was not supported. Results for the practitioner message 
groups indicated that there were no significant changes between participants’ pre-and 
post-test scores for favorability of republicans or democrats. Paired samples t tests 





Hypothesis two predicted that political information knowledge, political 
efficacy, social trust, and institutional trust would not increase after discussion of the 
practitioner message. Hypothesis two was supported in that participants showed no 
increase in political information knowledge, political efficacy, or social trust and 
institutional trust (see Table 2). Furthermore, analysis of the results indicated that 
participants’ level of institutional trust decreased significantly after exposure to and 
discussion of the practitioner message, t(43) = -3.73, p = .001. A large effect size was 
detected (g =-.80). The 95% confidence interval for the mean difference between the 
pre- and post-test was -1.47 to -.44. 
 





Issue Awareness 19.05 (5.68) 17.43 (5.63) * 
Republican ideology placement 13.70 (3.75) 13.70 (3.00) 
Democrat ideology placement 14.08 (3.23) 14.33 (3.68) 
Political Information 1.22 (.53) 1.14 (.48) 
Efficacy 21.11 (5.90) 21.10 (6.25) 
Social Trust 13.55 (5.01) 13.02 (5.58) 
Institutional Trust 8.59 (2.84) 9.55 (2.99) *** 







Table 2: Party Favorability of Practitioner Message Recipients  
 
 
Self Identified  
Party Affiliation 
View of Republican Party 
Pretest                             Posttest         
Mean (SD)                      Mean (SD) 
View of Democratic Party 
Pretest                               Posttest         
Mean (SD)                        Mean (SD) 
Republican 71.25(14.94)                71.67 (15.13)   33.18 (17.50)                 34.55 (17.10) 
Democrat 40.12 (22.01)               41.29 (20.65) 75.94 (16.06)                 75.39 (15.04) 
Independent  
 
39.20 (27.12)               39.20 (27.12) 
 
41.00 (30.90)                 41.00 (30.90) 
Other 50.00 (n/a)#                   50.00 (n/a)# 50.00 (n/a)#                     50.00 (n/a)# 
# Denotes n value equal to 1 
 
The second set of hypotheses concerned the effects of the deliberative 
message. Hypothesis three claimed that following exposure to and discussion of the 
deliberative message the following areas would increase: political knowledge, social 
trust, and institutional trust. As Table 3 shows, the results from the paired samples t 
test partially support the political knowledge section of research hypothesis three. 
Analysis of the results indicates participants’ level of political knowledge increased 
significantly on three measures: Issue Awareness Scale t(40) = 3.04, p =.004, the 
Democratic political party ideology scale t(24) = -2.74, p = .011, and the Political 
Information Scale t(30) = -10.80, p < .01. The Issue Awareness Scale effect size g of 
5.89 indicates a large effect, and the 95% confidence interval for the mean difference 
between the pre and posttest was 5.56 to 12.44. The Democratic political party 
ideology placement scale effect size g of -.77 indicates a large effect. The 95% 
confidence interval for the mean difference between the pre and posttest was -2.17 to 
-.30. The Political information Scale effect size g of -2.74 indicates a large effect, and 




-1.65 to -1.12. Results for the Republican political party ideology place scale were not 
significant. Results from the paired samples t test did not support the social and 
institutional trust portion of hypothesis three, as there were no significant changes 
between participants’ pre- and post-test scores. 
Hypothesis four predicted that political efficacy and party favorability would 
not increase following the deliberative message focus groups. The results from the 
paired samples t test support the efficacy portion of the hypothesis. Results indicated 
no significant change between participants’ pre- and post-test scores for efficacy (see 
Table 4). There was partial support for party favorability as analysis of the results 
showed participants’ levels of favorability towards the Republican Party did not 
significantly increase after exposure to and discussion of the deliberative message. 
However, analysis of the results showed that self-identified Republicans did view the 
Democratic Party significantly more favorably after exposure to and discussion of the 
deliberative message, t(9) = -2.53, p = .032. The effect size g of -1.13 indicates a 
large effect. The 95% confidence interval for the mean difference between the pre- 









Issue Awareness 17.83 (4.75)  16.05 (4.81) ** 
Republican ideology placement 12.38 (4.00) 12.28 (4.03) 
Democrat ideology placement 14.40 (3.85) 15.64 (3.33)* 
Political Information 1.45 (.62) 2.84 (.45) ** 
Efficacy 20.95 (5.50) 20.95 (5.49) 
Social Trust 14.70 (5.25) 14.28 (5.49) 
Institutional Trust 9.55 (2.96) 9.68 (2.81) 
Note: N = 41. * p < .05; ** p < .01. 
 
Table 4: Party Favorability of Deliberative Message Recipients  
 
 
Self Identified  
Party Affiliation 
View of Republican Party 
Pretest                              Posttest        
Mean (SD)                      Mean (SD) 
View of Democratic Party 
Pretest                          Posttest           
Mean (SD)                   Mean (SD) 
Republican 69.70 (14.50)               67.70 (12.32) 38.50 (13.13)              42.70 (14.60) * 
Democrat 36.93 (21.74)               36.00 (18.77) 76.07 (14.76)              78.07 (14.30) 
Independent  
 
48.90 (11.22)               45.70 (10.67) 53.90 (11.16)              57.20 (11.67) 
Other 22.33 (24.83)               20.67 (25.72) 52.00 (37.60)              53.75 (39.45) 
Note: N = 41. * p < .05.  
 
The third set of hypotheses concerned the effects of the agonistic message. 
Hypothesis five claimed party favorability would increase after exposure to and 
discussion of the agonistic message. The results indicate that exposure to the 




Hypothesis six claimed that political knowledge, political efficacy, social trust, and 
institutional trust would increase after exposure to and discussion of the agonistic 
message. In regard to political knowledge, there was partial support as participants’ 
scores increased significantly on the Political Information Scale, t(29) = -10.93, p < 
.01. The effect size g of -2.82 indicates a large effect, and the 95% confidence 
interval for the mean difference between the pre and posttest was -1.54 to -1.06. 
Results indicated no significant change for other political knowledge measure, 
efficacy, social trust and institutional trust.  
 





Issue Awareness 19.49 (4.54)  18.78 (4.47)  
Republican ideology placement 13.03 (3.86) 12.19 (3.49) 
Democrat ideology placement 14.50 (3.34) 14.43 (2.97) 
Political Information 1.57 (.68) 2.87 (.43) ** 
Efficacy 21.22 (4.50) 21.59 (5.11) 
Social Trust 14.42 (5.10) 13.73 (5.56) 
Institutional Trust 9.33 (2.65) 9.65 (2.20) 






Table 6: Party Favorability of Agonistic Message Recipients  
 
 
Self Identified  
Party Affiliation 
View of Republican Party 
Pretest                             Posttest         
Mean (SD)                      Mean (SD) 
View of Democratic Party 
Pretest                               Posttest         
Mean (SD)                        Mean (SD) 
Republican 70.94 (14.90)             64.82 (20.35) 38.24 (18.38)                 43.41 (19.00)
Democrat 39.84 (15.24)             42.05 (18.40) 69.63 (14.21)                 72.00 (10.38)
Independent  
 
60.00 (42.43)#           60.00 (42.43)# 55.00 (21.21)                 50.00 (28.28)
Other 47.50 (3.54)               40.00 (14.14) 67.50 (24.74)                 70.00 (28.28)







Chapter 5: Discussion  
 The two-part purpose of this study was to build the theoretical foundation for 
a third type of political communication known as agonism and then validate the 
approach through a mixture of quantitative and qualitative analysis. To achieve this 
end, the study constructed three political messages (practitioner, deliberative, 
agonistic) based on each of their respective theoretical approaches. Each political 
message then served as the basis for separate small discussion groups. The possible 
effects of the messages on a number of measurements were analyzed through a 
pretest/posttest design. Sufficient empirical evidence was found to partially support 
the hypotheses for the influence of practitioner, deliberative, and agonistic political 
communications on voter decision-making.  
 Statistical analysis showed that participants receiving the practitioner message 
demonstrated increased political knowledge on one of the three political knowledge 
scales, the Issue Awareness Scale. The Issue Awareness Scale requires participants to 
identify the Republican and Democratic parties on traditional issues based on the 
likelihood that the party would either support or not support the issue. Given the 
practitioner approach’s highly partisan message, it is not surprising participants 
increased their ability to place the parties correctly. Furthermore, statistical analysis 
revealed that participants in the practitioner group also showed a decrease in 
institutional trust. While the study originally hypothesized no change on this variable, 
it is understandable why institutional trust decreased after receiving the practitioner 




create divisions in the moral arena by utilizing a highly divisive, negative tone. This 
approach can then cause citizens to question the integrity of politicians, institutions, 
and the political process, which can easily result in a loss of institutional trust 
(Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Patterson, 2002).  
 Concerning the deliberative message, statistical analysis showed strong 
support for the deliberative message’s ability to increase an individual’s political 
knowledge. Participants scored higher on the Issue Awareness Scale, Political 
Information Scale, and the Democratic portion of the Ideology Placement Scale. 
These findings further support the growing body of evidence demonstrating that the 
deliberative message’s substantive approach can greatly increase an individual’s 
political knowledge (Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; Gabor, 2007; Iyengar, Fishkin, & 
Luskin, 2005; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002; Min, 2007). Furthermore, results 
revealed that self-identified Republicans viewed the Democratic Party more favorably 
after exposure to and discussion of the deliberative message. This finding is 
especially important in that it was the only instance of significant shift in party 
favorability. This shift might be explained by the fact that the deliberative message 
was the only message to offer a direct, factul comparison between the two parties. 
Thus, viewers were given the chance to instantaneously compare the parties on the 
same items. Furthermore, the absence of highly partisan language may have made the 
recipients more receptive to the information.  
 The statistical results for the agonistic message were limited. The only 




knowledge on the Political Information Scale. This scale required participants to 
remember such facts as the unemployment rate and inflation rate. This finding 
supports the agonistic message’s goal of increasing the individual’s factual 
knowledge. The long-term goal is then to have individuals incorporate this factual 
information into their decision making process. However, as a whole, the statistical 
analysis did not show support for agonism on any of the remaining variables.  
 While quantitative analysis can certainly give us insight into how the three 
messages influence voter decision-making, a look at the qualitative data offers a more 
nuanced understanding of these influences. From a theoretical perspective, this paper 
proposed a two-step argument. First, the dominant forms of political communication, 
practitioner and deliberative, contain fundamental weaknesses that necessitate a third 
way of political communication. Specifically, practitioner communication creates 
acrimonious divisions while imparting little knowledge, and deliberative 
communication, while imparting substantive policy information, does little to help 
citizens understand how the facts affect them and in turn motivate them to participate. 
In order to address these broader concerns, a more qualitative approach is necessary.  
 As noted above, the first step of this paper concerned itself with establishing 
the shortcomings of current practitioner and deliberative political communication. An 
examination of the open-ended questions and the group discussions offers some 
evidence of the problems inherent in the practitioner and deliberative approaches to 
political communication. When asked whether or not the message was informative, 




four important themes: distrust in the facts provided, criticism for the lack of 
argumentation depth, desire for both sides to be heard, and strong emotional backlash 
against the sponsoring party.   
Concerning the distrust in the facts, a self-identified moderate Republican 
provides a typical answer, “It was more opinionated than informative. Because I can 
see the bias in this message, I am hesitant to believe these are all reliable facts.” 
Moreover, numerous participants, regardless of party affiliation, described the 
message as “propaganda” and “deceptive.” For example, a moderate participant 
identifying party affiliation as “Other” wrote, “It seems to be unfairly bashing 
democrats without giving specific examples. Seems like BS.” Furthermore, another 
participant identifying as a moderate conservative added, “It is informative but I’m 
not sure if it is reliable. Where are they getting their facts from? Just because they say 
Democrats are this way doesn’t mean they are in reality.” 
The second theme emerging from the practitioner message groups was a 
criticism of the message’s lack of depth. Participants explained that the message 
“lacked strong examples supporting the statements,” which “can be misleading to 
readers.” More specifically, when asked if the message was informative, one 
participant identifying as slightly liberal asserted, “Not in any way shape or form. 
Obviously the arguments were lopsided and had no explanation why the Republican 
message is better.” Moreover, another participant identifying as liberal explained, 
“This message was barely informative. There is too much focus on bashing the 




information…it’s basically an over-dramatized ad – that persuades, NOT [emphasis 
in original] informs.” Additionally, one self-identified liberal participant answered a 
short-answer question regarding whether or not the message was informative by 
writing, “Not really informative. The Republican Party says what they want to, 
however, they don’t tell you why they’re going to do it or how they plan to do it.” 
Last, one participant identifying as slightly liberal responded to the message by 
writing, “I felt it was slander and mainly persuasive. There was no true information in 
its message, just plans and insults.” 
A desire to hear both sides of the argument was the third theme arising out of 
the practitioner message groups. At the beginning of the discussion group, one 
participant identifying as slightly liberal stated, “I’m sick of all these one-sided 
campaign ads bashing each other. I just wish someone would give me both sides of 
the story.” Another participant identifying as Republican added, “I feel the message 
was very one-sided. I would like to see the Democrats support their own view instead 
of Republicans talking about it.” These two quotes highlight the common desire for 
both sides to be heard.    
Last, participants in the practitioner groups also demonstrated strong 
emotional backlashes to the sponsoring party. For instance, one participant, 
identifying as slightly liberal, stated, “They seemed to forget that a Republican was in 
office when [emphasis in original] the stock market crashed and when the plans for 
the bailouts began. Also, if they hadn’t spent trillions on a war to find weapons that 




And maybe they should stop giving tax breaks for outsourcing our jobs.” Again, these 
characteristic answers offer support to the criticisms of the practitioner approach.   
 Concerning the deliberative message, participants resoundingly agreed that 
the deliberative message was informative. However, participants also levied two main 
criticisms: the message assumed too much prior knowledge, and the message failed to 
explain how the facts translated to real life effects impacting their lives. When 
explaining the difficulty in understanding the message, one participant wrote, “It 
gives a lot of information and statistics that I didn’t know. Some of it is a little 
confusing for me because I don’t understand what the statement implies.” Another 
participant felt that the message was informative, but went on to say that, “it was a lot 
of statistics with very little reasoning and that made it difficult to attempt to 
understand the other point being placed forward by the other party.” Last, when asked 
if the message was informative, one participant answered, “Yes, it stated the facts in a 
listed manner which made it easy to read and understand but at the same time no, 
because it was pretty basic with its descriptions and if you are not in the know of 
what is going on, then you wouldn’t be able to understand what the message was 
talking about.”  
The second concern the participants raised dealt with the message’s inability 
to explain how the facts influenced their lives. One participant noted that the 
message, “didn’t explain how those prices or budgets will effect the public.” Another 
participant added, “I feel that this definitely was informative, but now I just want to 




effects of all the extra money the democrats plan to use.” Moreover, one participant 
explained, “I feel that this message does give valuable information but lacks the detail 
of how the money will directly impact Americans.” These representative statements 
illustrate the validity of the critiques against the deliberative approach.  
 The second step of this paper focused on overcoming the shortfalls of the 
practitioner and deliberative approaches by developing agonism as a possible third 
way of political communication. While the quantitative analysis did not strongly 
support the potential of agonism as an alternative, a more qualitative approach 
demonstrates that agonism certainly began to fulfill its theoretical purpose and 
potential. First, the majority of participants described the message as informative. 
When asked if the message was informative, one participant responded, “Yes, I 
believe it briefly describes the issues we need to address and also gives logical 
solutions to these issues” Furthermore, another participant added, “Yes, it offered 
solutions and explained them well.”  
 In addition to providing substantive information, agonism strove to create 
division in the political realm and not the moral realm. After examination of both the 
short answer questions and the discussions, it appears that participants were in fact 
less likely to demonstrate outrage or disgust towards the other party. When discussing 
the message, one participant identifying as slightly conservative explained, “I feel 
like it was informative, but it was obviously biased…Plus, I disagree with the article, 
I don’t think that reducing corporate tax will help create more jobs.” When describing 




(0= Conservative, 10=liberal), answered, “It was informative, but I still believe the 
democratic way of thinking (government in control of money issues, not the people) 
is a much smarter and safer play.” These statement are representative of the type of 
disagreement in the agonistic groups. When disagreeing with the message or other 
group members, participants in the agonistic groups were less likely to condemn the 
message as libelous or the source as ill intentioned, which was common in the 
practitioner groups. While it is certainly difficult to assess the overall success of an 
approach after a single study, these results certainly offer hope that agonistic political 
communication can fulfill its theoretical goals.  
 This shift from quantitative to qualitative analysis raises additional insights 
that necessitate discussion. Beyond offering support for the theoretical argument, 
examination of the group discussions reveals a gap between participants’ political 
knowledge, as tested by the various scales, and their functional political knowledge. 
The term functional political knowledge is used to describe the basic cumulative 
knowledge necessary to hold a political discussion. This knowledge includes an 
elementary understanding of government, history, and current political events.   
 While the mean scores on first two political scales (Issue Awareness scale and 
Iyengar, Fishkin and Luskin’s political party ideology placement scale) demonstrated 
a basic grasp of politics, participants’ self-disclosures and comments during 
discussion illustrate a critical lack of functional political knowledge. Concerning self-
disclosures, it was extremely common for at least two participants in each discussion 




major parties planned on handling the recession, one participant simply said, “I am 
not knowledgeable in any way, shape, or form.” Furthermore, another participant 
added, “I am not very knowledgeable either. I don’t have any idea what’s going on 
right now and I’m embarrassed to say that. When I watch the news, I don’t 
understand what they are talking about. So it’s discouraging, so I just turn it off.” 
These self-disclosures begin to illustrate the participants’ inability to engage in a 
political discussion. However, self-disclosure is only one sign of this issue.  
 Throughout the discussions, participants also illustrated little understanding of 
the U.S. governmental system, American history, and current political events. For 
example, when discussing the current financial crisis and the role of government, one 
student explained that this current situation was not a big deal. This judgment was 
based on the student’s belief that the Great Depression occurred in the 1950’s and that 
the government did not have to do anything to pull the country out of the depression. 
Additionally, during a discussion about possible governmental action concerning the 
current recession, a student in another group added that stimulus checks would not 
work because people would spend them instead of save them. The importance of 
these examples lies in the fact that these misunderstandings of political basics 
severely hinders the participant’s and group’s ability to maintain a constructive 
political conversation. This finding may suggest that more comprehensive political 
knowledge scales such as Delli Carpini and Keeter’s (1996) Political Knowledge 
Scale may offer a more accurate measure of political knowledge. Furthermore, this 




information if one hopes to push individuals past their misunderstandings and pre-
conceived political assumptions.   
 The above discussion introduces the third point necessitating further analysis: 
the importance of substantive information in political communication. From both a 
quantitative and qualitative perspective, the deliberative message was associated with 
important findings. From a quantitative perspective, the deliberative message groups 
were the only ones to see significant increases on all measures of political knowledge. 
Additionally, the deliberative groups were the only groups to see a shift in party 
favorability (self-identified Republicans become more favorable towards the 
Democratic party). This finding supports the growing literature illustrating how 
substantive policy information can both increase political knowledge and cause shifts 
in political decision-making (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2004; Fishkin & Luskin, 1999; 
Iyengar, Fishkin, & Luskin, 2005; Luskin, Fishkin, & Jowell, 2002; McCombs & 
Reynolds, 1999).  
 Qualitatively examining the group discussions further reveals the benefits of 
providing substantive policy information in political communication. Groups 
receiving the deliberative message demonstrated increased likelihood to critically 
challenge their political assumptions and those of other participants. For example, 
after reviewing the deliberative message, a self-disclosed Republican explained that 
she originally thought the Republican stimulus plan was the best because it was half 
the amount of the Democrats’ plan. After participating in the group, she now felt the 




infrastructure. Such fundamental changes in what individuals believed raise an 
important question: what is the goal of political communication?  
As discussed earlier, this paper conceptualizes one of the goals of political 
communication as helping citizens arrive at decisions that best represent their 
thoughts and values. In a representative democracy, a form of government built upon 
citizen self-rule through party affiliation, it seems vital that citizens understand which 
party and candidates best represent them. In light of this study’s findings coupled 
with other scholars’ work, it appears that substantive policy information inarguably 
plays an essential role in that thought process. Therefore, it seems imperative that 
scholars and practitioners alike reassess their study and practice of political 
communication.  
The final point requiring further analysis comes from the quantitative findings 
in the practitioner message groups. Participants in these groups were the only ones to 
show a decrease in institutional trust from the pretest to the posttest. More 
specifically, the statistical analysis reported earlier showed that a large portion of the 
variability in institutional trust was not due to chance but instead caused by exposure 
to and discussion of the practitioner message. While this is certainly not enough 
support to sound an alarm, it does raise important questions as to the importance of 
institutional trust in a large-scale democracy and the nature of the practitioner 
message.  
Democracy was originally envisioned as a form of government best suited for 




individuals to understand their surroundings. However, in modern times, this task 
becomes much more difficult as democracies grow in size and scope. Couple that 
difficulty with the fact that as democracies grow, the citizen’s autonomy decreases 
simply due to the increased number of people with a say in government.  
These two effects then increase the importance of institutional trust. In a 
small-scale democracy, citizens could know and trust each other. However, in a large-
scale democracy, institutions become the focus and connecting point for widely 
dispersed and unknown others who compete over shared resources. As Taylor (2007) 
explains, institutional trust is imperative for large-scale democracy because citizens 
are bound to be on the losing side of the democratic majority. In those situations, the 
individual’s institutional trust is one of the major determinants governing whether the 
individual accepts the decision. The individual must believe the system is fair and that 
it can work to his or her advantage in the future. Without that belief, there is little 
reason for people to accept democratic decisions that rule against them.   
Furthermore, institutional trust is a significant determinant of whether or not 
citizens actively participate in politics. It seems simple that citizens must trust in 
institutions if they are going to use them as a vehicle for change. Therefore, it is 
disturbing that the most common form of political communication, practitioner, was 
on the only message type associated with a significant drop in institutional trust. In 
summary, for the long-term health of American democracy, it seems necessary to 




Chapter 6: Study Limitations and Future Research 
Although this study revealed some important findings about how different 
forms of political communication influence voter decision-making, these findings 
need to be understood in light of a number of limitations. First, a major purpose of 
this study was to establish agonism as a third way of political communication. While 
the researcher feels great strides have been taken towards building the theoretical 
foundation, the tangible political communication output is still in its initial stages. 
Therefore, future research can focus on constructing and refining how agonism 
manifests itself as real-world political communication. Additionally, researchers 
could check whether the participants understand the agonistic approach in the 
intended fashion by performing a manipulation check. These steps can further 
develop agonism in the realm of political communication.  
Second, this study provided participants with a single message, from a single 
source, the Republican Party. Future researchers can broaden this approach by 
providing participants with messages that represent both sides of the political 
spectrum, Democrat and Republican. By utilizing this more balanced approach, 
researchers can better mimic the back-and-forth nature of real-world political 
communication.  
Third, this research study employed a single exposure research design to 
examine how differing message styles effect voter decision-making. Future research 
into this area can alter this approach by exposing participants to the message(s) 




political communication environment participants are accustomed to. Moreover, voter 
decision-making is a long-term process. Therefore, researchers may use a longitudinal 
approach to examine the long-term effects of multiple exposures over a greater period 
of time. This research design seems best equipped to examine whether or not agonism 




Chapter 7: Conclusions  
 
 As I reflect on this project, I cannot help but to return to my original belief 
that American democracy is capable of something better. It has been widely 
documented that Americans have little interest in politics and only about 50%-60% of 
them turn out to vote in presidential elections (U.S. Census Bureau, 1991,1998). I 
firmly believe this failure is partially attributable to how we communicate politics.  
 The first part of this study set out to analyze what seemed to be part of the 
problem: the practitioner and deliberative approaches. I believe that the practitioner 
communication style stunts the growth of our democracy. By relying on highly 
emotional, substantively shallow communication, practitioner communication deters 
citizens from moving beyond simple emotional instincts and partisan ideology. While 
this style may be effective in achieving the short-term goals of winning elections, it 
seems to disregard the long-term implications of such communication. Simply put, if 
we are stuck talking about the complexities of our vastly interconnected nation and 
world in mere emotionally charged slogans, we are certain to misunderstand and 
mistreat one another. However, the solution offered by the deliberative approach 
takes us too far in the opposite direction. Politics is more than substantive policy 
information and objective reasoning. Politics is about the belief that we can form a 
more perfect union. Politics is about aspiring for a better day. So we as a nation 
cannot settle for a form of political communication that removes these fundamental 




 At the outset of this study, I believed the theoretical arguments underlying the 
agonistic approach offered a better way. Having completed this study, I still believe 
this. I still believe that the average American voter is capable of approaching politics 
with a wider, more complex array of analytical tools. They are capable of balancing 
subjective emotions with objective reason, but we must first give them the necessary 
tools. By weaving together reasoned debate, emotionally engaging language and 
substantive policy information, agonistic political communication attempted to 
incorporate these very tools.  
 While this study did not shake my support of agonistic political 
communication, it did give me a broader understanding of our current political 
situation. The discussion groups highlighted just how little college students know and 
care about politics. That said, I do not believe this is a permanent state. Instead, I 
believe it is a clear call for better civic education. I cannot blame the participants for 
their lack of political knowledge because it was also clear that they simply did not 
understand the wide and extensive impact of political decisions on their lives. Beyond 
necessitating better civic education, this finding reinforces the importance of the 
explanatory function of agonism. Individuals not only need the facts, but they need 
them explained in a way that is meaningful to their lives. Yet, it is important that this 
explanation is not reduced to a point where it oversimplifies the truth.  
 From this study, a clearer, more complex picture of political communication 




all of our problems. However, as communication scholars, I think we can all agree 
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Constructing the Message: The Influence of Practitioner, Deliberative, and Agonistic Political 




The Department of Communication Studies at the University of Kansas supports the practice 
of protection for human subjects participating in research.  The following information is 
provided for you to decide whether you wish to participate in the present study.  You may 
refuse to sign this form and not participate in this study.  You should be aware that even if 
you agree to participate, you are free to withdraw at any time.  If you do withdraw from this 
study, it will not affect your relationship with this unit, the services it may provide to you, or 
the University of Kansas.   
 
PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
The purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of how differing political message 




You will be asked to fill out a 36 question online pretest related to different aspects of 
politics. After completion of the pretest, you will be asked to engage in a 45-minute 
discussion with up to 11 other participants regarding your thoughts and feelings about the 
American economy. Expertise in the area of politics and economics is not required for 
participation in this study. The discussion will be overseen and facilitated by the researcher. 
Furthermore, the discussion will be video taped for use by the researcher for analysis 
purposes only. In no way will your image appear in the research or anywhere else. When not 
in use, the tapes will be stored in a locked cabinet. After completion of the discussion session, 
you will be asked to complete a 36-question online posttest related to different aspects of 
politics. The entire process should take approximately 90 minutes.  
 
RISKS    
 
There are no risks anticipated during this research.  
 
Approved by the Human Subjects Committee University of 
Kansas, Lawrence Campus (HSCL).  Approval expires one year 






By participating in this research you are helping researchers gain a better understanding of 
how differing styles of political communication affect voter decision-making. This will aid 
both researchers and practitioners of political communication in the development of a more 
effective form political communication. 
 
PAYMENT TO PARTICIPANTS  
 
While there will be no monetary payment, you might receive course credit for participating in 




Your name will not be associated in any way with the information collected about you or 
with the research findings from this study.  The researcher will use a study number or a 
pseudonym instead of your name.  The researchers will not share information about you 
unless required by law or unless you give written permission.    
 
Permission granted on this date to use and disclose your information remains in effect 
indefinitely.  By signing this form you give permission for the use and disclosure of your 
information for purposes of this study at any time in the future. 
 
REFUSAL TO SIGN CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
 
You are not required to sign this Consent and Authorization form and you may refuse to do 
so without affecting your right to any services you are receiving or may receive from the 
University of Kansas or to participate in any programs or events of the University of Kansas.  
However, if you refuse to sign, you cannot participate in this study. 
 
CANCELLING THIS CONSENT AND AUTHORIZATION 
 
You may withdraw your consent to participate in this study at any time.  You also have the 
right to cancel your permission to use and disclose information collected about you, in 
writing, at any time, by sending your written request to: 
Carl Walz 
The University of Kansas 
Communication Studies 
Bailey Hall 
1440 Jayhawk Blvd., Room 102 
Lawrence, Kansas 66045-7574.  
 
If you cancel permission to use your information, the researchers will stop collecting 
additional information about you. However, the researcher may use and disclose information 
that was gathered before they received your cancellation, as described above.  
 
 





Carl Walz                                    Jay Childers Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator                        Faculty Supervisor 
Communication Studies   Communication Studies 
102 Bailey Hall                                  116F Bailey Hall  
University of Kansas                            University of Kansas 
Lawrence, KS 66045                            Lawrence, KS  66045 
785 864-1160                              785 864-1474 
 
If you have any questions about your rights as a research participant you may contact the 
Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL) office at  864-7429 or 864-7385 or 
write the Human Subjects Committee Lawrence Campus (HSCL), University of Kansas, 
2385 Irving Hill Road, Lawrence, Kansas   66045-7563, email dhann@ku.edu or 
mdenning@ku.edu. 
 
KEEP THIS SECTION FOR YOUR RECORDS.  IF YOU WISH TO PARTICIPATE TEAR 






Constructing the Message: The Influence of Practitioner, Deliberative, and Agonistic Political 
Campaign Messages on Voter Decision Making 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
                                                           (Project/Study Title) 
 




If you agree to participate in this study please sign where indicated, then tear off this section 
and return it to the investigator(s).  Keep the consent information for your records. 
 
I have read this Consent and Authorization form. I have had the opportunity to ask, and I 
have received answers to, any questions I had regarding the study and the use and disclosure 
of information about me for the study.   
 
I agree to take part in this study as a research participant.  By my signature I affirm that I am 
at least 18 years old and that I have received a copy of this Consent and Authorization form. 
 
 
_______________________________         _____________________ 












Party Identification  
 
The ANES Party Identification Scale 
 
3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or other? (Please circle one) 
 
a. Republican          b. Democrat          c. Independent          d. Other 
 
 
4. If Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong 
Republican? (If not Republican, please skip this question).  
   
  Not very strong                Strong 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
5. If Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat? (If 
not a Democrat, please skip this question).   
   
  Not very strong                Strong 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
6. If Independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? 
(If not Independent, please skip this question). 
 
Closer to the Republican Party        Closer to the Democratic Party 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
Party Favorability  
 
Iyenger, Fishkin and Luskin (2005) Feelings Thermometer  
 
7. There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people 
to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these 
groups. Using a “feeling thermometer”, where would you put the following groups on the 
thermometer? 
 










Patterson and McClure’s Issue Awareness Scale  
 
8. The Republican Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as Medicare 
and Social Security.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  




9. The Democratic Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as 
Medicare and Social Security. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
10. The Republican Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
11. The Democratic Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
12. The Republican Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
13. The Democratic Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  




Ideology Place Scale (Iyengar, Fishkin and Luskin (2005) 
 
14. Some people think the federal government should provide fewer services, such as health 
and education, in order to lower taxes. Suppose those people are at one end of the scale, at 
point 1. Other people feel it is important for the federal government to provide more services 
even if it means higher taxes. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
Democratic Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
 
15. Some people believe that we should spend less money for defense and focus much more 
on solving domestic problems. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that defense spending should be greatly increased even if it means reduced 
spending on domestic problems. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
Democratic Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
 
16. Some people feel that we should subsidize American industries even if it means we lose 
markets for our goods abroad. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that we should pursue increased free trade even if we may lose some 
existing jobs. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People who are exactly in 
the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at points 2, 3, 5, or 6. 
Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t you thought much 
about this? 
 
Republican Party: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 






Political Information Scale (Iyengar, 1986; Zaller, 1986) 
 
17. What do you think is the current unemployment rate? 
 
 
18. What do you think is the current rate of inflation – that is, by what percent have prices 
increased this year over last? 
 
 
19. Is the federal budget deficit larger or smaller than it was when George W. Bush took 





Niemi, Craig, and Mattie (1991) 
 
23. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
24. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
25. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
26. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
27. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






28. People like me don’t have any say about what government does.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
29. I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  





Zmerli and Newton (2008) 
 
30. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people? (Can't be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat 
suspicious.)  
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 




31. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? (Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat 
appropriately and straightforwardly.)  
      
 You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 
          0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10    
 
 
32. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking 
out for themselves? (Helpful: the intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic 
helpfulness.) 
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 






Craig, Niemi, and Silver (1990) 
 
33. Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is still the best for us.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
34. There is not much about our form of government to be proud of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
35. It may be necessary to make some major changes in our form of government in order to 
solve the problems facing our country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
36. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  















Pretest Survey   
 
Survey ID Number (below, place the first 3 letters of your last name, and the last 4 digits of 
your primary telephone number).   
 
________ ________ ________                ________ ________ ________ _______ 
(first 3 letters of last name)                     (last 4 digits of your primary telephone number) 
 




What is your ethnic origin:  
_____ Asian or Pacific Islander  _____ Non-Hispanic White (Caucasian) 
_____ African American                          _____ Spanish or Hispanic origin  
_____  Multi-racial or mixed race _____ Native American     
 
1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a conservative or a liberal? (Please 
circle one) 
  
 Conservative             Liberal  
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
2. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on 
which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale [or haven’t you 
thought much about this]? (Please circle one) 
 
1                   2       3  4  5   6  7 
Extremely  Liberal      Slightly       Moderate:         Slightly    Conservative     Extremely 
Liberal            Liberal       Middle of      Conservative             Conservative 
          the road 
 
0. Haven’t thought 8. Don’t know 
 
3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or other? (Please circle one) 
 






For questions 4-6, please circle one. 
 
4. If Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong 
Republican? (If not Republican, please skip this question).  
   
  Not very strong                Strong 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
5. If Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat? (If 
not a Democrat, please skip this question).   
   
  Not very strong                Strong 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
6. If Independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? 
(If not Independent, please skip this question). 
 
Closer to the Republican Party        Closer to the Democratic Party 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
7. There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people 
to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these 
groups. Using a “feeling thermometer”, where would you put the following groups on the 
thermometer? 
 




Republicans. _______    Democrats. ________ 
 
 
For questions 8-13, please circle how likely you feel the statement is.  
 
8. The Republican Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as Medicare 
and Social Security.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  







9. The Democratic Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as 
Medicare and Social Security. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
10. The Republican Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
11. The Democratic Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
12. The Republican Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
13. The Democratic Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
14. Some people think the federal government should provide fewer services, such as health 
and education, in order to lower taxes. Suppose those people are at one end of the scale, at 
point 1. Other people feel it is important for the federal government to provide more services 
even if it means higher taxes. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 






15. Some people believe that we should spend less money for defense and focus much more 
on solving domestic problems. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that defense spending should be greatly increased even if it means reduced 
spending on domestic problems. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
Democratic Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
 
16. Some people feel that we should subsidize American industries even if it means we lose 
markets for our goods abroad. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that we should pursue increased free trade even if we may lose some 
existing jobs. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People who are exactly in 
the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at points 2, 3, 5, or 6. 
Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t you thought much 
about this? 
 
Republican Party: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 






17. What do you think is the current unemployment rate? 
 
 
18. What do you think is the current rate of inflation – that is, by what percent have prices 
increased this year over last? 
 
 
19. Is the federal budget deficit larger or smaller than it was when George W. Bush took 
office in 2000? 
 
 
For questions 20-29, please circle your level of agreement 
 
20. Limited government and free markets are the best way to ensure America’s prosperity.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  





21. Government should cut spending on social programs such as Medicare and Welfare in 
order to reduce overall spending.   
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
22. The government should reduce spending on social programs such as Welfare and 
Medicare.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
23. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
24. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
25. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
26. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
27. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
28. People like me don’t have any say about what government does.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






29. I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






For questions 30-32, please circle one 
30. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people? (Can't be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat 
suspicious.)  
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 




31. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? (Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat 
appropriately and straightforwardly.)  
      
 You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 
          0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10    
 
 
32. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking 
out for themselves? (Helpful: the intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic 
helpfulness.) 
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 
          0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10    
 
 
For questions 33-36, please circle your level of agreement 
 
33. Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is still the best for us.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






34. There is not much about our form of government to be proud of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
35. It may be necessary to make some major changes in our form of government in order to 
solve the problems facing our country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
36. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  








Pre-test Open-ended questions 
 
Instructions: 
There is certainly a lot of information out there about what should be done to fix the 
economy. Here is one example of that. Please take a couple minutes to look it over and 
answer the questions below.  
 












3. Do you feel that this message was informative? Please explain your answer as best as 





Discussion Group Questions 
 
I. Introduction to study (1-2 minutes) 
a. Facilitator: Welcome everyone. Today we are here to talk about the 
economy. This doesn’t mean you have to be an expert on politics or the 
economy. Instead, the goal is to find out what normal college students know 
and think about the economy. This is an informal discussion, but I would still 
like you to keep some basic rules in mind. First, please do not hold side 
conversations during the group discussion. Second, since this is an 
exploratory discussion, I would like everyone to actively participate.  
II. Participant Introductions (1-2 minutes) 
a. Now I would like to begin by having everyone briefly introduce him or 
herself. 
b. Question: What is your first name and as of today, what kind of job would 
like to have after you graduate? (Going around the room in a designated 
order) 
III. Discussion of the economic situation (40 minutes) 
a. We are all college students around the same age. In a short time, most of us 
will be out on the job market looking for jobs, and some of you may 
currently be working your way through college. With this in mind…. 
i. Question: Do you think the economy is headed in the right 
direction? 
ii. Question: How has the current economic situation affected you or 
your family and friends?  
iii. Question: What do you think led to the current economic downturn? 
iv. Question: Do you think the Republicans or the Democrats have a 
better plan for the economic recovery? 
v. Question: What roles should the political parties play in the 
economic recovery? 
vi. Question: If your state representative asked you what you thought 
needed to be done to right the economy, what would you say? 
vii. Question: Do you think there is anything that you can do about the 
economic situation? 
1. Question: Let’s just say that you could do something, what 
would you do? 
viii. Question: What do you think the economic situation will look like 










Posttest Survey   
 
Survey ID Number (below, place the first 3 letters of your last name, and the last 4 digits of 
your primary telephone number).   
 
________ ________ ________   ________ ________ ________ ________ 
(first 3 letters of last name)                     (last 4 digits of your primary telephone number) 
 
1. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a conservative or a liberal? (Please 
circle one) 
  
 Conservative             Liberal  
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
2. We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. Here is a 7-point scale on 
which the political views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal to 
extremely conservative. Where would you place yourself on this scale [or haven’t you 
thought much about this]? (Please circle one) 
 
1                   2       3  4  5   6  7 
Extremely  Liberal      Slightly       Moderate:         Slightly    Conservative     Extremely 
Liberal            Liberal       Middle of      Conservative             Conservative 
          the road 
 
0. Haven’t thought 8. Don’t know 
 
 
3. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an 
Independent, or other? (Please circle one) 
 
c. Republican          b. Democrat          c. Independent          d. Other 
 
 
For questions 4-6, please circle one. 
 
4. If Republican, would you call yourself a strong Republican or not a very strong 
Republican? (If not Republican, please skip this question).  
   
  Not very strong                Strong 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
5. If Democrat, would you call yourself a strong Democrat or not a very strong Democrat? (If 
not a Democrat, please skip this question).   
   
  Not very strong                Strong 






6. If Independent, do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic Party? 
(If not Independent, please skip this question). 
 
Closer to the Republican Party        Closer to the Democratic Party 
0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10 
 
 
7. There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people 
to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these 
groups. Using a “feeling thermometer”, where would you put the following groups on the 
thermometer? 
 




Republicans. _______    Democrats. ________ 
 
 
For questions 8-13, please circle how likely you feel the statement is.  
 
8. The Republican Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as Medicare 
and Social Security.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
9. The Democratic Party favors spending more on domestic social programs such as 
Medicare and Social Security. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
10. The Republican Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
11. The Democratic Party favors spending less money on the military. 
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  






12. The Republican Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
13. The Democratic Party favors a “flat tax” policy that taxes all individuals equally, 
regardless of their income.  
 
Extremely            Quite            Slightly            Not Sure            Slightly            Quite            Extremely  
Likely               Likely           Likely                 Likely              Likely          Likely 
 
 
14. Some people think the federal government should provide fewer services, such as health 
and education, in order to lower taxes. Suppose those people are at one end of the scale, at 
point 1. Other people feel it is important for the federal government to provide more services 
even if it means higher taxes. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
Democratic Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 
 
15. Some people believe that we should spend less money for defense and focus much more 
on solving domestic problems. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that defense spending should be greatly increased even if it means reduced 
spending on domestic problems. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People 
who are exactly in the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at 
points 2, 3, 5, or 6. Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t 
you thought much about this? 
 
Republican Party:  1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 






16. Some people feel that we should subsidize American industries even if it means we lose 
markets for our goods abroad. Suppose these people are at one end of the scale, at point 1. 
Other people feel that we should pursue increased free trade even if we may lose some 
existing jobs. Suppose these people are at the other end, at point 7. People who are exactly in 
the middle are at point 4, and of course other people have positions at points 2, 3, 5, or 6. 
Where would you place the Republican and Democratic Parties or haven’t you thought much 
about this? 
 
Republican Party: 1   2   3   4   5   6   7   Haven’t thought much about this 
 






17. What do you think is the current unemployment rate? 
 
 
18. What do you think is the current rate of inflation – that is, by what percent have prices 
increased this year over last? 
 
 
19. Is the federal budget deficit larger or smaller than it was when George W. Bush took 
office in 2000? 
 
 
For questions 20-29, please circle your level of agreement 
 
20. Limited government and free markets are the best way to ensure America’s prosperity.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
21. Government should cut spending on social programs such as Medicare and Welfare in 
order to reduce overall spending.   
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
22. The government should reduce spending on social programs such as Welfare and 
Medicare.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






23. I consider myself to be well qualified to participate in politics. 
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
24. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our 
country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
25. I feel that I could do as good a job in public office as most other people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
26. I think that I am better informed about politics and government than most people.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
27. Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can’t 
really understand what’s going on.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
28. People like me don’t have any say about what government does.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
29. I don’t think public officials care much what people like me think.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  





For questions 30-32, please circle one 
30. Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be 
too careful in dealing with people? (Can't be too careful: need to be wary or always somewhat 
suspicious.)  
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 




31. Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got a chance or 
would they try to be fair? (Take advantage: exploit or cheat; fair: in the sense of treat 
appropriately and straightforwardly.)  
      
 You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 
          0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10    
 
 
32. Would you say that most of the time people try to be helpful or are they mostly looking 
out for themselves? (Helpful: the intended contrast is between self-interest and altruistic 
helpfulness.) 
  
You can’t be too careful         Most People can be 
trusted 
          0       1       2       3       4       5       6       7       8       9       10    
 
 
For questions 33-36, please circle your level of agreement 
 
33. Whatever its faults may be, the American form of government is still the best for us.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
34. There is not much about our form of government to be proud of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  
Strongly    Somewhat        nor Disagree          Somewhat    Strongly 
 
 
35. It may be necessary to make some major changes in our form of government in order to 
solve the problems facing our country.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  






36. I would rather live under our system of government than any other that I can think of.  
 
Agree                      Agree                      Neither Agree                      Disagree                      Disagree  

















Agonistic Message  
 
 
 
 
 
 
